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Abstract
The paper introduces the mechanism of the Flow-based 
Capacity Allocation (FBA) method on the electricity market 
of the Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) Region, proposed by the 
Central Allocation Office (CAO). The method is a coordinated 
heterogeneous multi-unit uniform price auction where the allo-
cation is determined by the solution of a linear programming 
problem. On one hand, the properties of the underlying lin-
ear programming problem are discussed: the possibilities of 
multiple solutions are analysed, then a non-standard sensitiv-
ity analysis method of the market spread auction is developed. 
On the other hand, a global optimization problem is presented 
that yields uniform auction prices corresponding to higher 
total income than at the original allocation method. Several 
numerical examples and results of practical test problems are 
presented.
Keywords
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1 Introduction
In the electricity market, beside the power exchange, trans-
mission capacities are also traded. Transmission capacities 
mean the right to transmit a certain value of power in a given 
time period from a given source to a given sink of the electric-
ity network. The original owners of capacities are the Trans-
mission System Operators (TSOs). They can sell them to the 
users of the network (whole sale traders, retailers etc). There 
are several ways of capacity allocation: bilateral contracts, 
OTC markets, auctions etc.
In the following, a coordinated auction model is analysed, 
which is intended to be introduced to the CEE electricity mar-
ket: the Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) region consists of Aus-
tria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. Only the so-called cross-border transmission 
capacities are considered, those are transmission rights between 
the areas of two different TSOs. Remark that, in the CEE, an 
area of a TSO (or association of TSOs) typically means an area 
of a country (countries).
According to the European Community Regulations 
1228/2003/EC and 714/2009/EC, a market-based mechanism 
has to be adopted to allocate the capacities. It has the following 
requirements:
● prevention of overloading,
● efficient deals with interdependent physical flows,
● avoidance of discrimination in allocating electricity 
transmission capacities.
Hence, instead of the former OTC bilateral contracts, CEE 
TSOs intend to introduce stepwise a coordinated flow-based 
allocation of cross-border electricity transmission capacities at 
interconnections between CEE TSOs. The steps are
(a) Coordinated Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) assessment 
method. It is an explicit coordinated auction, however, 
only the available cross-border capacities are taken into 
account. This model is applied now.
(b) Coordinated flow-based allocation (FBA) method. It 
is planned to be introduced soon. This model takes the 
properties of the whole electricity network into account.
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There is a wide range of literature on congestion manage-
ment methods as well as on their proposals for the European 
market. Regulation 1228/2003 is analysed by Boucher and 
Smeers (2002) and Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005). The inves-
tigated FBA method is based on zonal pricing: the properties 
of nodal, uniform or zonal pricing are discussed in Ding and 
Fuller (2005). Within the sectors uniform pricing is applied, 
however, e.g., the model of nodal pricing can be found in 
Stigler, Heinz, Todem and Christian (2005) (as regards Aus-
tria) and in Leuthold, Weigt and von Hirschhausen (2008) (as 
regards Germany). The publications, proposals of ETSO-E 
(2012) should also be taken into account.
The approach of our paper is different to the above. While 
most literature analysed the methods theoretically, our discus-
sion is based on practice:
● instead of theoretical systems, the auction rules published 
by CAO (2011) are analysed and
● the FBA model has also been implemented and used in 
energy-trading Informatics Platforms of Systems Ltd.
On one hand, we would like to share the experiences of the 
implementation and tests of the method: focusing on multiple 
optima and sensitivity analysis. On the other hand, we would 
like to demonstrate an alternative auction model, which also 
fulfills the requirement of the European Community Regula-
tions 1228/2003/EC and 714/2009/EC, however, the total 
income of the TSOs are greater than the FBA method.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the FBA 
method is introduced. In Section 3 the cases of multiple optima 
and a particular sensitivity analysis are discussed. In Section 4 
a global optimization problemis introduced in order to maxi-
mize the total income of the TSOs. Here some comparisons 
with the results of original FBA auction are presented. Section 5 
concludes the paper. Finally, all notations and abbreviations are 
explained in the Nomenclature at the end of the paper.
2 Mechanism of the FBA method
The coordinator of the auction is the Central Allocation 
Office (CAO), which is founded and owned by the TSOs of 
the CEE region. The detailed rules of the market can be found 
on the CAO website (CAO 2011). In order to make the paper 
self-contained, the auction rules are summarized in this section.
There are eight TSOs (APG, CEPS, ELES, TENNET, MAVIR, 
PSEO, SEPS, a.s. and 50HzT), however, in the market APG, 
TENNET and 50HzT constitute one zone. Hence, the trade is pos-
sible among five zones. Regarding the type of the auctions there 
are yearly, monthly and daily auctions. In case of daily auction, 
capacities can be purchased separately for each hour of the day.
As regards the scheduling of the auction: in the first period 
(called nomination) the market participants submit their bids 
(extended with a correction cycle), then in the second period 
the CAO calculates the auction prices, capacity allocations and 
announces them at a certain cut off time.
Every bid consists of
● the source-sink pair, i.e. from which zone to which zone 
the capacity is required,
● the required quantity of capacity (in MW),
● the offered bid price for one unit capacity 
(in EUR/MWh).
The network is represented in the following way. Initially, 
the critical lines of the network are identified. Then, on one 
hand, a loading plan on the network is published: i.e., how 
many MWs are loaded on each critical line in case of transmis-
sion of one MW from a given zone to another given zone. On 
the other hand, the maximum available capacities of each criti-
cal line are presented.
The loads are represented by the Power Transfer Distribu-
tion Factors (PTDF) matrix. It is a set of PTDFs expressing 
the influence of commercial exchanges between all source-sink 
pairs to all critical lines (so called outage combination). I.e.,
● the value of 
 represents how much capacity is used on linek in case of 
transmission of 1MW from Zonex to Zoney.
● Each line has a direction. If the actual Source-Sink pair 
uses the line in this direction, then the PTDF is positive, 
in case of opposite direction it is negative.
● The actual PTDF is published on the CAO ePortal (2011).
The Available Maximum Flow (AMF) values give the maxi-
mum capacities of the lines. I.e.,
● AMF+ (linek) is the maximum capacity in the direction of 
linek,
● AMF‒ (linek) is the maximum capacity in the opposite 
direction.
The reason of the two different capacities corresponding to 
the directions is that they are remaining capacities after long-
term contracts and previous auctions.
The PTDF and AMF values are published as an Excel file by 
CAO, prior to the auction. In case of daily auction the values of 
each hour are on separate sheets. One example is presented on 
Figure 1. The columns mean the following:
Critical Branch: a critical segment of the network
Case: ‘n-0’ means the primary physical ele-
ment, the ‘n-1’-type cases are the standby 
physical elements. The latters are used in 
case of any failure of the primary ele-
ment. In the modeling view, each Critical 
Branch/Case pair means a separate line.
Source: the physical source of the element
Sink: the physical sink of the element
The whole sheet has 5 × 4 = 20 PTDF columns corre-
sponding to the Source-Sink Pairs (5 Zones), and it has about 
1000 rows (Critical Branch/Case pairs).
PTDF Zone Zone linex y k( ), ,
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2.1 The LP model of the allocation
The allocation method should find the most efficient capac-
ity allocation subject to properties and limits of the transmis-
sion network and all bids together.
The auction is modelled by a linear programming (LP) prob-
lem, detailed below, where the constraints describe the proper-
ties of the network. The objective function is the so-called social 
welfare function. It represents the efficiency of network usage 
measured by the financial value of allocated capacities based on 
the submitted bid prices. Hence, in the FBA auction the welfare 
of the society (i.e., the utilization of the whole network) is maxi-
mized, despite the cases of bilateral contracts and OTC markets 
where the allocation could be at most Pareto optimal.
Based on the notations in the Nomenclature the model is the 
following. The social welfare will be maximized:
subject to the following constraints.
The network constraints represent the PTDF and AMF 
structures:
The allocated capacities cannot be negative or greater than 
the requested capacities:
2.2 Auction prices
The solution of the LP problem (2.1)–(2.5) yields the alloca-
tion of capacities. However, at the end of the auction uniform 
auction prices have to be announced to each source-sink zone 
pair, too. Those can be found in the following way.
The optimal solution of the LP problem also yields Shadow 
Prices (dual solutions) corresponding to the constraints. E.g.,
denote the shadow prices of lines. They represent an increase 
in the value of the objective function connected to the marginal 
increase of the corresponding AMF. Intuitively: the worth of 
one unit of capacity of the given direction of the line, regarding 
the optimal allocation. 
The Auction Price of source-sink pair from zone x to zone y 
is given by the formula:
Intuitively, this means that the auction price is the worth of 
one unit capacity on the certain source-sink pair: i.e. the sum of 
the usage percentage of each (directed) line multiplied by the 
worth of the line.
Then, the capacity allocation based on Auction Prices is the 
following:
● if the bid price is greater than the auction price, then the 
whole requested quantity of the capacity is allocated,
● if the bid price is less than the auction price, then zero 
capacity is allocated,
● if the bid price equals the auction price, then the requested 
capacity is partially satisfied until the limits of the net-
work constraints.
From the Complementary Slackness Theorem follows that an 
optimal allocation of the LP problem satisfies the above rules 
and vice versa.
2.3 The Market Spread Auction
The main reason of cross-border transmission is that the 
price of electricity is cheaper on the market of the source zone 
than on the market of the sink zone. Assume that the auction 
participants have some forecast on the zone prices. Let us use 
Fig. 1. Upper left corner of the PTDF of one hour of Daily Auction published by CAO.
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the following notations:
are the bid and ask price of one unit electricity at Zone x. Then 
assume that all bid prices are their reasonable upper limit. The 
question is that how much capacity is allocated on each sink-
source pair. I.e., the following auction is considered: one bid 
for each source-sink pair is submitted with parameters
In practice, the market spread auction is the most common 
tool to get a first impression on the market before bidding. 
However, the forecasts of the zone prices have errors. Hence, 
the sensitivity analysis, which is presented in the following sec-
tion, is very important.
3 Multiple optima, sensitivity analysis
3.1 Multiple optima
The auction rule is well-defined only if it yields unique allo-
cation and auction prices for each bid combination. As regards 
the allocation the multiple optima of the primal LP problem can 
be problematic, while the multiple optima of the dual problem 
can cause indeterminate auction prices. As it will be seen, the 
primal case is regulated well by the auction rules while in the 
dual case the multiple optima do not occur in practice.
3.2 Alternative optimal allocations
The following phenomena can happen:
(a) there are two bids with same Source-Sink Pair and Bid 
Price and at least one of their requests is just partially 
satisfied,
(b) there is a bid with zero bid price which can be (at least 
partially) satisfied,
(c) there are other types of multiple optimal solutions.
Let us consider some examples illustrating the above phe-
nomena. The network is characterized in Table 1.
Table 1 follows the structure of the CAO datasheet (see Fig-
ure 1) and it is assumed to be valid for the first hour of the day 
(H01). In the following, only bids on the MAVIR->PSEO and 
MAVIR->ELES are considered. Hence only data in bold are 
important for us.
The examples follow the structure of CAO result sheet. The 
product ‘H01’ means that the bids submitted for the first hour 
of the day. Phenomena a, b, c are illustrated in Tables 2, 3, 4, 
respectively.
p x y b p y p x d x y bb bid ask b( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , = − , , , = +∞,
for all x y Zones, ∈ .
Tab. 1. Characterization of the network.
Tab. 2. Example for Phenomena a.
Tab. 3. Example for Phenomena b.
Tab. 4. Example for Phenomena c.
p x p xbid ask( ) ( ),
Technical Parameters for Test
Parameters (1008)
Critical Branch Case Source Sink TMF AMF+ AMF- MAVIR → PSEO MAVIR → ELES
LINE_00001 n-0 APG APG 305 30 166 0.5 0.6
LINE_00001 n-1 LINE_00002 APG APG 305 20 126.9 0.1 0.2
Requested Bids Awarded Bids
Product Source Sink Requested Capacity [MW] Bid Price [EUR/MWh] Awarded Capacity [MW] Auction Price [EUR/MWh]
H01 MAVIR PSEO 70 1 0<=x<=60 1
H01 MAVIR PSEO 60 1 60-x 1
Requested Bids Awarded Bids
Product Source Sink Requested Capacity [MW] Bid Price [EUR/MWh] Awarded Capacity [MW] Auction Price [EUR/MWh]
H01 MAVIR PSEO 20 1 20 0
H01 MAVIR PSEO 10 0 0<=x<=10 0
Requested Bids Awarded Bids
Product Source Sink Requested Capacity [MW] Bid Price [EUR/MWh] Awarded Capacity [MW] Auction Price [EUR/MWh]
H01 MAVIR PSEO 20 10 20 5
H01 MAVIR ELES 20 12 20 6
H01 MAVIR PSEO 20 5 0<=x<=16 5
H01 MAVIR ELES 20 6 80/6-5/6*x 6
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The first two situations are managed by Annex 5 of the Auc-
tion Rules of CAO (2011):
● As regards Situation a: The “First-Come-First-Serve 
Principle.” has to be used. I.e., the bid submitted earlier 
must be preferred.
● Regarding Situation b: the auction rules say “the Bid Price 
is replaced for optimization algorithm purposes with a very 
small number not influencing the Auction Price calcula-
tion.”. I.e., if any unused capacity remains in the network, 
it must be allocated among the submitted zero-priced bids.
Multiple optimal allocations can be arisen only in case of mul-
tiple optimal (primal) bases. Hence, alternative allocations can 
be produced only by the precise setting of the bid prices and/or 
the PTDF and AMF values. This situation can happen naturally 
only in case of Phenomena a and b. The problems with Phenom-
enon c cannot arise spontaneously thanks to the number of rows 
and the structure of the PTDF matrix. However, those problems 
can be set artificially, see e.g. Figure 3. Hence, in practice the 
Auction Rules exclude the undefined allocations. This was con-
firmed by the results of CAO FBA Dry Run II (2009).
3.3 Alternative auction prices
As regards the auction prices, they can be indefinite in case of mul-
tiple optima of the dual of the (auction) LP problem. Beside complex 
situations, this can arise as in the following simple example.
Example 3.1 The PTDF matrix is defined in Table 5. The sub-
mitted bid and results are illustrated in Table 6. The reason of mul-
tiple dual optima is that in the LP model the (AMF+) constraint 
(2.2) of LINE_00001 and the (requested capacity) constraint (2.4) 
of the bid are fulfilled by equality at the same time. This means 
that the values of the corresponding (primal) slack variables are 
zero. Those variables represent the optimality conditions of the 
dual problem, hence, the only dual basis variable can correspond 
to the constraint of LINE_00001 or to the bid constraint. This 
means two optimal dual basesand infinite optimal dual solutions. 
Indeed, if we perturb the requested capacities:
● in case of e.g., 59MW requested capacity, exactly the bid 
constraint will be the basis and the auction price will be 
zero (the awarded capacity will be 59),
● in case of e.g., 61MW requested capacity, exactly the 
AMF+ constraint will be the basis and the auction price 
will be 10 (the awarded capacity will be 60).
The Auction Rules do not exclude the multiple dual solutions. 
However, among the practical tests of CAO FBA Dry Run II 
(2009) there is no example for alternative auction prices.
3.4 Sensitivity analysis of Market Spread Auction
In this section the Market Spread Auction, defined in Section 
2.3, is considered. Assume that the bid and ask prices of elec-
tricity at a given Zone k change by the same value Δp. Let the 
changed solution be marked by “ ‘ ”. The questions are
(a) the sensitivities of Auction Prices. i.e.
(b) The sensitivity intervals. I.e., the intervals, where
as well as the accepted capacities
for all x, y  Zones, x ≠ y remain constant.
Let us illustrate the above by the following
Example 3.2 Consider a Market Spread Auction with PTDF 
matrix ”Test 2 Daily Auction 7AB” in CAO FBA Dry Run II 
(2009) and Zone prices
Assume that
The Auction Prices depending on the price of Zone DE_AT 
are presented on Figure 2. The Awarded Capacities depend-
ing on the price of Zone DE_AT are depicted by Figure 3. It is 
Tab. 6. Submitted bid and results of Example 3.1.
Tab. 5. Characterization of the network of Example 3.1.
∆ ,
∆
=
′ , − ,
∆
, , ∈ , ≠ .
AP x y
p
AP x y AP x y
p
x y Zones x y( ) ( ) ( ) for all
∆ ,
∆
AP x y
p
( )
d x y ba
' ( ), ,
p CZ_SK p CZ_SKbid ask( ) ( )= = ;43
p DE_AT p DE_ATbid ask( ) ( )= .
p PSEO p PSEObid ask( ) ( )= = ;43
p MAVIR p MAVIRbid ask( ) ( )= = ;54
p ELES p ELESbid ask( ) ( )= = .34
Requested Bids Awarded Bids
Product Source Sink
Requested
Capacity [MW]
Bid Price
[EUR/MWh]
Product Source Sink
Awarded
Capacity [MW]
Auction Price 
[EUR/MWh]
H01 MAVIR PSEO 60 1 H01 (1h) MAVIR PSEO 60 0<=x<=10
Technical Parameters for Test
Parameters (1008)
Critical Branch Case Source Sink TMF AMF+ AMF- MAVIR → PSEO
LINE_00001 n-0 APG APG 305,2 30 166 0.5
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easy to see that both types of sensitivity are constant on certain 
intervals. The endpoints of those intervals correspond to the 
changes of optimal bases of the LP problem. This can be illus-
trated by the mixed chart of Figure 4, where the intervals are 
changing at the same points.
In order to calculate the endpoints of the sensitivity intervals 
a special sensitivity analysis should be applied because more 
than one parameter of the LP is changing. I.e., if the price of 
Zone k changes by Δp, then the new bid prices will be
where x ≠ y, x ≠ k, y ≠ k.
Let us use the compact form of Market Spread Auction problem:
               pTd    →  max
  subject to
                Ad    ≤    b
     d    ≤    0,
where constraints (3.6) are the network constraints (2.2), (2.3) 
of the auction LP problem. The bid constraints (2.4) are skipped, 
because the values of the requested capacities are infinity.
Let B be the matrix of optimal basis of the above problem.
The vector of changed bid prices can be written into the form:
where
′ = + ∆ ⋅ ,p p p u
u k y b u x k b u x y b x y x k y k( ) ( ) ( ), , = − , , , = + , , , = , ≠ , ≠ , ≠ .1 1 0
(3.7)
Fig. 3. Awarded Capacities depending on the price of Zone DE_AT
(3.6)
′ , , = − + ∆ = , , − ∆ ,p k y b p y p k p p k y b pbid ask( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( )
′ , , = + ∆ − = , , + ∆ ,p x k b p k p p x p k y b pbid ask( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( )
′ , , = − = , , ,p x y b p y p x p x y bbid ask( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Fig. 2. Auction Prices depending on the price of Zone DE_AT
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Then the optimality conditions of B:
Substituting (3.7) the above inequalities can be written as
and
Hence, the sensitivity interval is Δp  (Δpmin, Δpmax) where
and
Remark, in case of simultaneous changes of the Zone prices 
the sensitivity analysis can be solved similarly. The difference 
is that instead of intervals, the sensitivity remains constant if 
Δp is within a certain polyhedron.
4 Social welfare and total revenue of the TSOs
In the CAO auction rules the objective function of the LP 
problem is calculated by the submitted bid prices while the bid-
ders have to pay only the uniform auction prices of the source-
sink pairs. I.e., the objective is to maximize
however, the real revenue of CAO (TSOs) is
Hence, the income of the TSOs will be usually different to the 
value of the objective function. In order to illustrate the arising 
questions consider the PTDF and AMF values of Table 7.
Example 4.1 Consider the bids and results of Table 8.
Here, the optimal value of the objective function is:
F = 10 ∙ 19 + 1 ∙ 1 = 191,
however, the corresponding income is only
R = 1 ∙ 19 + 1 ∙ 1 = 20.
In this section an alternative auction model is presented where
● uniform prices are announced,
F p x y b d x y b
x y Zones b Bids
b a= , , ⋅ , , ,
, ∈ , ∈
∑ ( ) ( )
(4.8)
Fig. 4. Endpoints of sensitivity intervals are at the changes of optimal bases
Tab. 7. Characterization of the network.
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Technical Parameters for Test
Parameters (1008)
Critical Branch Case Source Sink TMF AMF+ AMF- MAVIR → PSEO MAVIR → ELES
LINE_00001 n-0 APG APG 305 30 166 1 0
LINE_00001 n-1 LINE_00002 APG APG 305 20 126.9 1 1
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● the rules of “capacity allocation based on Auction Prices” 
of Section 2.2 remain valid, 
● the objective function is the total income and 
● in the capacity allocation there are no residual capaci-
ties that can be allocated among the remaining capacity 
requests. (The model efficiently deals with interdepend-
ent physical flows.)
Hence, the auction model fulfills the requirements of the 
European Community Regulations (see Section 1). Comparing 
this model to the model of CAO:
● the objective function of the alternative model is more 
reasonable. 
● Despite the LP problem of CAO, the alternative model is 
a nonconvex nonlinear programming problem.
Let us illustrate the difference between the two models by 
the following example
Example 4.2 Consider the PTDF matrix of Table 7 and the 
bids and results of Table 9. The 6th and 7th columns show the 
results of auction LP of CAO while the last two columns represent 
the solution of the alternative model with income maximization. 
The exact formulation of the alternative model is the fol-
lowing. The notions are the same as at the LP problem of 
Section 2.1 completed by the following type of variables:
dr(x, y, b): the remaining demand that can be satis-
fied from the residual capacities at the 
end of the auction. 
Those variables must equal zero in order to allocate the 
capacities efficiently.
Hence, the objective function is
where M is a big number.
The following constraints are considered. No allocated capac-
ity under the auction price:
All requested capacities above the auction price are fully 
satisfied:
The allocated and free capacities:
Constraints corresponding to the bid properties:
The (nonnegative) variables are:
The nonnegativities of the remaining demands with con-
straints (4.12) prevent against the overloading.
Problem (4.9) – (4.16) is a nonconvex (quadratically con-
strained) quadratic programming problem (QP). This type of 
problems can be solved, e.g., by the method of Audet et al. 
(2000). However, possibly a more effective solution method 
could be found by the exploitation of the special properties of 
the problem. It is based on the simple fact, that the maximum 
is attained at auction prices that equal to one of the submitted 
bid prices. The detailed development of the method is out of 
the scope of this paper and will be the part of future research.
d x y b x y Zones b Bidsa ( ), , ≥ , ∈ , ∈0 (4.14)
(4.15)d x y b x y Zones b Bidsr ( ), , ≥ , ∈ , ∈0
AP x y x y Zones( ), ≥ , ∈ .0 (4.16)
Tab. 8. Submitted bid and results of Example 4.1.
Tab. 9. Submitted bid and results of Example 4.2.
(4.9)
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
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

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+
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∑ ∑
AMF k
PTDF x y k d x y b
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a
( )
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( )
+ , ,( )





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∈ ,
−
d x y b
AMF k
k Lines
r
(4.13)
Product Source Sink
Requested
Capacity [MW]
Bid Price
[EUR/MWh]
Source Sink
Awarded
Capacity [MW]
Auction Price 
[EUR/MWh]
H01 MAVIR PSEO 19 10 MAVIR PSEO 19 1
H01 MAVIR PSEO 2 1 MAVIR PSEO 1 1
Product Source Sink
Requested
Capacity [MW]
Bid Price
[EUR/MWh]
Awarded
Capacity [MW]
Auction Price 
[EUR/MWh]
Awarded
Capacity [MW]
Auction Price 
[EUR/MWh]
H01 MAVIR PSEO 19 10 19 1 19 10
H01 MAVIR PSEO 2 1 1 1 0 10
H01 MAVIR ELES 1 0 0 0 1 0
Revenue 20 Revenue 190
max ( ) ( ) ( )
x y Zones b Bids
a rAP x y d x y b M d x y b
, ∈ , ∈
∑ , ⋅ , , − ⋅ , ,( )
d x y b d x y b d x y b
x y Zones b Bids
a r b( ) ( ) ( ), , + , , ≤ , , ,
, ∈ , ∈
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Here, only one illustrative practical example is presented in 
order to show, that based on the capacity allocation of the origi-
nal linear programming auction method, higher income can be 
realized by setting the auction prices independently from the 
shadowprices of the lines.
Example 4.3 Consider Hour 10 in Test Daily 2 Auction 7A 
of CAO FBA Dry Run II (2009). Table 10 shows the auction 
prices of the LP method and auction prices resulting the same 
allocation based on the rules of Section 2.2. In the second case 
simply the highest bid prices have been chosen, which do not 
change the allocation (i.e., the bid prices at the border between 
the zero and positive allocations). The values of the real total 
incomes are also presented.
Remark that the total income may be increased further by find-
ing the optimal capacity allocations of the new model. However, 
in order to do this a special nonconvex QP solver is needed.
Example 4.3 presents a practical test problem where still in 
case of the same capacity allocation, the use of auction prices 
independent from the shadow prices can result higher income. 
Remark that one reason for the use of auction prices based on 
shadow prices is that shadow prices play an important role in some 
possible distribution methods of the income, see Leuthod and 
Todem (2007). However, the shadow prices are calculated on the 
base of the submitted prices, and does not reflect the auction prices. 
The above experiences have exploited some important prop-
erties and drawbacks of the auction method. They can help in 
thinking over the auction rules as well as in development of 
bidding strategies.
5 Conclusion
The paper presents an introduction to the mathematical part 
of the FBA auction rules with a more detailed discussion than 
Tab. 10. Auction prices based on shadow prices vs. based on bid prices with the same capacity allocation
Aggregated Auction Results
Product Source Sink
Requested Capacity
[MW]
Awarded Capacity
[MW]
Auction Price
(based on shadow 
prices)
[EUR/MWh]
Auction Price
(independent from 
shadow prices)
[EUR/MWh]
H10 APG CEPS 101 0 111.45 1
H10 APG ELES 90 0 200 51
H10 APG MAVIR 156 0 142.32 50
H10 CEPS APG 99 99 0 0
H10 CEPS ELES 240 200 103.06 200
H10 CEPS MAVIR 70 10 32.53 50
H10 CEPS TPS 135 135 0 0
H10 CEPS VET 135 135 0 0
H10 ELES APG 87 87 0 0.5
H10 ELES CEPS 200 200 14.25 200
H10 ELES MAVIR 270 200 47.05 200
H10 ELES PSEO 200 0 220.45 201
H10 ELES TPS 200 200 0 200
H10 ELES VET 200 200 0 200
H10 MAVIR APG 105 105 0 0
H10 MAVIR ELES 250 200 104.73 200
H10 MAVIR PSEO 100 58 200 200
H10 MAVIR SEPS 180 50 1.66 3
H10 PSEO ELES 200 200 78.96 200
H10 PSEO SEPS 10 10 0 0.14
H10 PSEO VET 35 35 0 30
H10 SEPS ELES 20 0 103.06 51
H10 SEPS MAVIR 80 10 32.53 50
H10 TPS CEPS 315 0 111.45 2
H10 TPS ELES 200 0 200 200
H10 VET CEPS 115 0 111.45 1
H10 VET ELES 200 0 200 200
Real Income: 81 943.6 29 3844.9
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Abbreviations
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 direction of the line.
APG  APG-Austrian Power Grid AG., Austrian TSO.
CAO Central Allocation Office.
CEE  Central-Eastern Europe Region.
CEPS ČEPS, a.s., Czech TSO.
CZ_SK Zone of CEPS and SEPS.
DE_AT  Zone of 50HzT, APG and TENNET. 
ELES  Elektro-Slovenija, d.o.o., Slovenian TSO 
 and its zone. 
ETSO-E European Network of Transmission System   
 Operators for Electricity.
FBA  Flow-based Capacity Allocation. 
MAVIR Hungarian Transmission System Operator   
 Company Ltd., Hungarian TSO and its zone. 
NTC  Net Transfer Capacity. 
OTC  Over-the-counter or off-exchange trading.
PSEO PSE Operator S.A., Polish TSO and its zone.
PTDF Power Transfer Distribution Factor.
SEPS Slovenská elektrizačná prenosová sústava, 
 a.s., Slovak TSO.
TENNET TenneT TSO GmbH, German TSO.
TMF Total Maximum Flow. The technical upper 
 limit on the power flow on the network 
 element.
TSO Transmission System Operator.
Indices
b Bid index.
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k Line index. 
Lines  Set of indices of the critical lines.
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the rules of CAO (2011). This, completed with the examples 
and numerical experiences, can make the paper a useful guide 
to learn about the FBA auction mechanism.
From the mathematical point of view, on one hand, the 
description of sensitivity analysis of zone prices can help in 
its implementation to programmers and/or business analysts. 
On the other hand, the formalization of the revenue maximiza-
tion problem, beside its illustrative role, can be the first step to 
develop better bidding strategies. 
Remark that all methods and experiences of the paper can be 
applied to the present NTC allocation mechanism described in 
Annex 6 of the rules of CAO (2011), as well.
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